基于过度自信的逆供应链激励机制设计  

Incentive contract design of reverse supply chain on basis of overconfidence

作　　者：包晓英[1] 胡本勇[2] 唐小我[2] 

机构地区：[1]成都理工大学管理科学学院,成都610059 [2]电子科技大学管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2011年第9期3378-3380,共3页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005)

摘　　要：研究零售商过度自信下的逆供应链激励机制设计问题,通过数理推导分析了过度自信对逆供应链激励契约设计的影响机理,包括对收益共享系数、回收努力水平以及代理成本的影响,并依据作用机理设计最优激励合同。结论证明了过度自信在一定程度上改善了激励的有效性,对逆供应链激励合同的设计以及提高激励效率方面有重要的应用价值。Supposed the retailer was overconfident,this paper discussed incentive design on the basis of overconfidence.It analyzed the influences mechanism of overconfidence to incentive contract design including incentive coefficient,return effort level and agency cost with mathematical induction,and based the influences mechanism to design the optimum incentive contract.The results show the overconfidence advanced the valuable and has value on designing reverse supply chain incentive and improving incentive efficiency.

关 键 词：过度自信 逆供应链 回收努力水平 激励合同 

分 类 号：TP391[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]