基于绿色再制造的废旧产品回收外包决策分析  

Analysis of outsourcing decision-making on used products collection for green remanufacturing

作　　者：范体军[1] 楼高翔[1] 王晨岚[1] 陈荣秋[2] 

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2011年第8期8-16,共9页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871038;71010107011);国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2006BAB08B01);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(093YJC630071);上海市教育委员会科研创新重点资助项目(09ZS65);上海市浦江人才计划;上海市人才发展基金资助项目(2009018);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目

摘　　要：基于博弈理论构建了考虑激励因素和不考虑激励因素两种情况下废旧产品回收外包的决策模型,推导出临界外包成本,提出废旧产品回收是否外包取决于临界外包成本.通过算例,分析了考虑激励因素前后的两个模型中,再制造产品生产成本节约的变动对外包决策批发价、零售价、回收率、制造商利润以及临界外包成本的影响,认为对于废旧产品回收外包,引入激励因素有助于提高废旧产品的回收效率,提高制造商的收益.Outsourcing will be helpful for manufacturers to reduce collecting cost of used products and to improve the flexibility of remanufacturing.This paper presents outsourcing decision-making models of used products collection with and without incentive contracts based on game theory.Critical outsourcing cost is derived to make outsourcing decisions of collecting waste products.The effects of the unit cost savings of remanufacturing products on the wholesale price,retail price,returns rate,manufacturer＇s profit and critical outsourcing costs are compared with examples applied to the two models,and we find that outsourcing collection of waste products with incentive contracts is useful to increase the returns rate and improve the manufacturers＇ benefit.

关 键 词：再制造 产品回收 外包决策 博弈论 

分 类 号：F406.2[经济管理—产业经济]