基于政治锦标赛制的地方官员竞争行为分析  

Analysis on the Competition Behavior of Local Officials——Based on the Institution of Political Tournament

作　　者：杨宝剑[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 [2]济南大学管理学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2011年第9期29-34,共6页Research on Economics and Management

摘　　要：在分析政治晋升锦标赛制度的内涵及其实施条件的基础上,通过构建我国地方官员的总效用函数,探讨了地方官员的综合利益。利用政治晋升负外部性模型,分析了中央政府主要以经济产出作为考核地方官员的政治晋升制度,必然导致"竞争有余、合作不足"的结果,最后有针对性总结了晋升锦标赛制度的积极性与局限性。Based on the analysis of the core and implementation requirement of the political promotion tournament in- stitution, the paper discusses the comprehensive benefit of the local officials by constructing their aggregate utility function in China. The article uses negative externalities model of political promotion analyzing the inevitable result of ＂excessive competition, insufficient cooperation＂ while the central government puts economic output as a major political assessment of local officials, sums up definitely its positive role and limitation at last.

关 键 词：政治晋升锦标赛 地方官员激励 经济业绩 

分 类 号：F120[经济管理—世界经济]