基于技术风险的研发联盟政府补贴政策研究  

Research on Government Subsidy Policy for R&D Alliance Based on Technical Risk

作　　者：孟卫东[1] 范波[1,2] 马国旺[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院。重庆400047

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2011年第11期95-98,共4页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(08AJY028);重庆大学研究生创新团队项目(200909B006)

摘　　要：文章考虑研发存在技术风险,建立了合作研发博弈模型,研究了政府不同财政补贴方式(研发投入补贴和产品补贴)下的企业研发和生产策略。通过理论和数值仿真分析找出了不同补贴政策下的企业最优策略和相应的社会福利,并就政府的研发补贴政策提出了相应建议。研究表明,两种补贴政策均无法实现社会福利的最优解,研发难度较小的情况下宜采用研发投入补贴,研发难度较大的情况下应采用产品补贴,以此提高企业研发投入和社会福利。Considering the existence of technical uncertainty in R＆D process, this paper established a collaborative R＆D game model to study the corporate R＆D and production strategies in the different way of different government financial subsidies （R＆D input subsidies and product subsidies） . Through the theoretical and numerical simulation analysis, this paper found out the optimal business strategy and the corresponding social welfare under the different subsidy policy, additionally put for- ward the corresponding recommendations of the government＇ s R＆D subsidy policy. Studies have shown that both the two kinds of subsidy policies were unable to achieve the optimal solution of social welfare, in order to raise business R＆D and social wel- fare, the R＆D input subsidies should be adopted when the R＆D is not relatively difficult, products subsidies should be used when the R＆D is more difficult.

关 键 词：技术风险 研发联盟 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F810.452[经济管理—财政学]