个人所得税纳税遵从行为的演化博弈分析  

INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS

作　　者：黄阳[1] 周亚[1] 李克强[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学管理学院,北京100875

出　　处：《北京师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第4期437-440,共4页Journal of Beijing Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目

摘　　要：由于纳税人在申报收入时,存在"效仿"行为,并在一定程度上形成了"羊群效应",从而应用演化博弈方法对个人所得税的纳税遵从行为进行分析.结果表明,遵从率存在多均衡解,且在某些条件下。Individual income tax evasion is a phenomenon widely recognized in many countries, the level of non-compliance varies. A vast amount of research work has been done to study this phenomenon based on expected utility function, game theory and behavioral economics. But the existing research work has not given tangible explanation regarding the level of non-compliance, such as the high rate of tax compliance and multi- equilibrium. The authors believe that there exists group effect in individual decision of tax compliance and a theoretical framework was developed based on evolutionary games. It is concluded that there exist multiple equilibriums in the level of non-compliance and under certain conditions, the equilibrium is steady.

关 键 词：个人所得税 逃税 纳税遵从 演化稳定策略 复制子动态 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]