转移成本、价格歧视与银行竞争——基于霍特林模型的实证分析  

Price Discrimination with Switching Costs and Banking Competition——A Study Based on the Hotelling Model

作　　者：邓宗豪[1] 吴冰洋[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学政治学院,成都610064 [2]上海财经大学统计与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济问题》2011年第9期19-22,共4页On Economic Problems

摘　　要：在银行业竞争中,转移成本能够锁定消费者,使银行能够对锁定的消费者定一个较高的价格,但是,转移成本也使银行对没有被锁定的消费者的竞争更加激烈。研究发现,转移成本的存在增加了银行的利润,并且转移成本越高,银行从信贷中获得的利润越高。但是,当存在存款市场和贷款市场竞争时,由于价格歧视的存在,银行的利润随着转移成本的增加而降低,转移成本没有给银行带来优势。Switching costs can lock -in consumers and allow banks to set a higher price to the locked -in consumers. But switching costs is a double - edged sword, because there is more intense competition on consumers who have not been locked -in between banks. This study finds that switching costs increase bank profits. On the other hand, the bank profits decrease as switching costs increase when there are deposit market and loan market competitions, and switching costs do not bring advantage to the bank.

关 键 词：转移成本 价格歧视 银行竞争 锁定 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]