外部监督、股权激励与股权代理成本  

External Supervision,Stock-based Incentives and Equity Agency Costs

作　　者：王昌锐[1] 倪娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,武汉430073

出　　处：《经济问题》2011年第9期66-70,共5页On Economic Problems

基　　金：湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目"会计政策选择管制理论与效应研究";教育基本科研业务费青年教师资助重点项目"后金融危机时代下的会计准则等效研究"(2010004)

摘　　要：基于股权代理成本角度,采用2010年中国沪深两市发行A股的非金融类上市公司截面数据,并运用最小二乘法和logistic二元逻辑回归模型,研究了外部监督、股权激励与股权代理成本之间的关系。研究发现,股权代理成本高的公司更加倾向于寻求有效的外部监督,聘请高质量的会计师事务所;股权激励并不能起到完善公司内部治理机制的作用,反而会提高股权代理成本;股权激励会提高公司对外部审计质量的要求。Based on the section data of A -share non -financial listed companies in 2010, this paper empirically investigates the relationship among external supervision, stock -based incentives and equity agency costs by least squares and binary logistic regression model. The results show that companies with high equity agency costs will seek for efficient external supervision, and hire high quality accounting firms; stock - based incentives can not perfect the internal mechanism of corporate governance, instead, it raised the equity agency costs; stock - based incentives can increase the quality demand of the external auditing.

关 键 词：外部监督 股权激励 股权代理成本 审计质量 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]