基于不完全信息静态分析模型的西部区域旅游合作机制研究  

Research on Dynamic of Regional Tourism Cooperation Based on Incomplete Information Static Game

作　　者：陈实[1] 温秀[1] 李树民[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,西安710127

出　　处：《经济问题》2011年第9期114-117,共4页On Economic Problems

摘　　要：区域旅游合作是区域旅游发展到一定阶段的产物,运用不完全信息静态博弈理论分析了区域旅游合作的动力机制,得出在不完全信息的状态下,区域旅游合作行为能够产生的条件是低成本(对区域B来讲)和p≥C/δA(对区域A来讲)。西部地区进行区域旅游合作的动力来源于区域成本和收益的比较,作为管理主体的政府,其区域旅游合作动力为政府成本和收益的比较,具体表现为政府如何发挥其高效率,为旅游企业创造一个良好的社会环境,因此政府的主要行为就集中在区域政策的调整、政府的管理创新和区域旅游管理等方面;作为市场主体的旅游企业的动力来源于企业利润最大化,因此区域旅游合作主要包括构建以价值链为基础的资产纽带型旅游企业集团和以网络为基础的旅游企业网络平台。Regional tourism cooperation is the product of the development to a certain stage in regional tourism. The paper analyzed the dynamic mechanism of regional tourism cooperation using the incomplete information static game theory, then concluded the conditions of regional tourism cooperation behaviors are low cost （ to regional B ） and p≥C/δA（to regional A）. The dynamic machanism of regional tourism cooperation in western area comes from the comparison of costs and benefits. As managing subjects, government＇ s motive of regional tourism cooperation is the same. That is how to play a high - efficiency and create a good social environment for tourism enterprises. Therefore, the government~ main behavior is regional policy adjustment, government management innovation, and the behavior of regional tourism management. As market players, tourism enterprise＇s motive comes from the enterprise＇s profit maximization, so the main ways of regional tourism cooperation are tourist business collectivization based on the value chain and tourist enterprise informatization based on web.

关 键 词：区域旅游合作 不完全信息静态博弈 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：F59[经济管理—旅游管理]