奶站治理与奶源供应链系统改进——基于双重委托代理理论的分析  

Milk Station Governance and Amelioration of Milk Source Supply Chain System: Based on Double Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：道日娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]内蒙古大学经济管理学院,呼和浩特010021

出　　处：《农业经济与管理》2011年第4期87-96,共10页Agricultural Economics and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71003044);内蒙古自然科学基金项目(2010BS1007)

摘　　要：本文探讨了中国奶源供应链系统中固然存在的乳品企业与奶站、奶农与乳品企业之间的委托代理关系。通过建立双重委托-代理模型并对其求解发现,奶站的合作性努力水平与乳品企业掠夺奶农的租金、奶站成本系数和奶站自私性努力的收益负相关,与乳品企业激励强度和综合监控强度正相关。乳品企业的努力程度与其成本系数、掠夺奶农的租金、乳品企业产出的方差及其风险规避度负相关,与奶农对其激励强度正相关。文章还揭示出当前奶源供应链系统委托人合约选择的困境,以内蒙古呼和浩特市奶业契约为例,对奶源供应链系统运行过程中委托人合约选择的困境做出了进一步分析验证,并提出了治理和改进奶源供应链系统的对策建议。This paper analyzed the principal-agent relationships between the dairy company and milk station,dairy company and milk farmers.In terms of it,this paper based on the double principal-agent theory,constructed principal-agent model that was based upon the contract arrangements of the two sides,analyzed the qualitative relationship between the level of effort of agent and its influence factors,and then revealed the principals dilemma of contract arrangement.This paper,finally,suggested and discussed the designs to further perfect the governance of Chinese milk source supply chain system.

关 键 词：奶站 奶源供应链系统 双重委托代理理论 治理 

分 类 号：F326.3[经济管理—产业经济]