我国稀土出口贸易中利益相关方博弈分析  

A Study on Games of Interest Parties in Rare Earths Exports of China

作　　者：刘慧芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国地质大学(北京)人文经管学院

出　　处：《财贸经济》2011年第9期85-91,136,共7页Finance & Trade Economics

基　　金：中国地质大学(北京)资源环境管理实验室开放基金项目的资助

摘　　要：稀土进出口贸易中各方的利益获得不仅取决于自己的行为,也受到相关方行为的重要影响。作为世界最大的稀土资源国、生产国、出口国和消费国,我国对稀土出口的管理政策引致世界稀土进口国及其他稀土资源国的一系列反应措施。本文运用完全信息动态博弈模型分析我国与稀土进口国、我国与其他稀土资源国之间的博弈,研究得知各方为获得利益最大化可采取的策略选择以及相关各方博弈的结果,进而对我国稀土出口贸易管理提出建议。The interest of parties in the import and export of rare earths depends not only on their own behavior but also on other parties' act.China is the world's largest country of resources,production,exporting and consumption of rare earths,it's export management policies of rare earths cause a series of response measures of importing countries and other resource abundant countries of rare earths.Based on dynamic game model under complete information,this paper researches the game between China and importing countries,as well as China and other resource abundant countries of rare earths.Research reveals the strategies of benefits maximization of all parties and the game results.The paper puts forward some suggestion to China's export management of rare earths.

关 键 词：出口贸易 博弈分析 稀土 

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