政府内部上下级部门间谈判的一个分析模型——以环境政策实施为例  

Bureaucratic Bargaining in the Chinese Government: The Case of Environmental Policy Implementation

作　　者：周雪光[1] 练宏[2] 

机构地区：[1]美国斯坦福大学社会学系 [2]北京大学社会学系,博士研究生北京100871

出　　处：《中国社会科学》2011年第5期80-96,221,共17页Social Sciences in China

基　　金：斯坦福大学校长国际研究创新基金;中国发展研究基金会资助

摘　　要：政府内部上下级部门间讨价还价谈判是政府运作过程的重要组成部分,也是认识政府组织制度和行为的一个切入点;其总是发生并受制于特定组织背景以及相应的制度规则。有关委托方(如省环保厅)和代理方(如市环保局)之间的序贯博弈模型中,我们区分了委托方的两种策略选择:"常规模式"与"动员模式";代理方在随后的应对过程中在三种策略中加以选择:"正式谈判"、"非正式谈判"和"准退出"。在委托方采纳动员模式的条件下,"准退出"是代理方的最佳应对策略;而在常规模式下,代理方的应对策略选择有着更大空间。Bargaining between supervising and subordinate agencies is a ubiquitous phenomenon in governmental processes, taking place in specific organizational context and structured by the rules of the game. Hence, bureaucratic bargaining provides a port of entry from which to observe government institutions and behaviors. In the proposed sequential game of bargaining between a principal (e.g. a provincial environmental protection agency) and an agent (e.g. a municipal environmental agency), we identify two strategies—'routine' vs. 'mobilizational' mode—available to the principal. The agent can choose from three response strategies in its subsequent move: 'formal bargaining,' 'informal bargaining' or 'quasi-exit.' When the mobilizational mode is adopted by the principal, quasi-exit is the best choice for the agent; if the routine mode is present, the agent has more flexibility in choosing among the three alternatives.

关 键 词：政府谈判 谈判博弈 政府行为 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] X321[政治法律—中外政治制度]