信誉机制、信号显示与集群企业信用增级  

Reputation Mechanism,Signal Display and Credit Upgrading of Clustered Firms

作　　者：徐洪水[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310058 [2]中国人民银行丹东市中心支行,辽宁丹东118000

出　　处：《征信》2011年第4期6-9,共4页Credit Reference

摘　　要：银企博弈模型分析表明产业集群提高了企业道德风险的机会成本,信誉机制使集群企业总体信用增级;分离均衡模型研究第三方治理对两类企业的分离机制,信号显示使集群中的"好"企业信用增级。信誉机制与信号显示的分析表明,市场经济信用制度有赖于对特殊主义信任的保留,更需对普遍主义信任的拓展,这也凸显了现代征信制度建设的重要性。The game model analysis for bank-enterprise shows that the industry clusters increase the opportunity cost of corporate moral hazard,and that reputation mechanism has made the clustered firms wholly credit-upgraded.The research via the separation equilibrium model on the third party governance against separation mechanism for two types of enterprises shows that the signal display causes the ＂good＂ firms in the clusters to be credit-upgraded.Reputation mechanism and signal display analysis suggest that the credit system in market economy depends on the maintenance of a special trust doctrine,but also much more on the expansion of the general trust doctrine,which highlights the importance of building the modern credit system.

关 键 词：信誉机制 信号显示 集群信用增级 

分 类 号：F263[经济管理—国民经济] F832.4