中国金融抑制问题的政治经济学  

Political Economy of Financial Repression Issue in China

作　　者：尹希果[1] 许岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学贸易与行政学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2011年第5期10-17,124,共8页Modern Economic Science

摘　　要：本文从利益集团理论的视角对中国金融抑制问题给出了一个政治经济学解释,认为中国金融抑制的制度安排内生于给予改革当中利益受损集团金融补贴的需要,为了维护转轨时期的社会稳定,降低改革成本,在财政能力持续下降的情况下,中央政府通过加强对金融体系的控制,以利差租金和货币发行收益为主要路径向国有企业、政府财政提供金融补贴。但近年来,随着居民收入在国民收入分配中所占比例的下降,由金融抑制引发的社会风险的累积、金融效率损失等问题使得中国如果继续维持金融抑制政策将产生巨大的社会成本和效率损失。Based on the perspective of interest group theory, this paper offered an interpretation of politi- cal economy to the financial repression issue in China, which insists that the institutional arrangements of China＇s financial repression was born to the requirements of giving financial subsidies to the groups whose inter- ests were infringed in the reform. Under the circumstances of continual fiscal capacity decline, the central gov- ernment should stre ngthen financial system control with rent margin and currency gains as main channels to provide financial subsidies to state-owned enterprises and to government finance in order to maintain social sta- bility during the transition period and to reduce reform cost. But in recent years, with the decline of the pro- portion of residential income in national income distribution, a series of problems caused by financial repres- sion, will bring about enormous social costs and efficiency loss if China continues to maintain the policy of fi- nancial repression.

关 键 词：金融抑制 利益集团 金融补贴 政治经济学 

分 类 号：F832.0[经济管理—金融学]