电子政务外包的最优激励契约设计  

Optimal Incentive Contract Design on E-government Outsourcing

作　　者：陈东灵[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《商业研究》2011年第9期79-85,共7页Commercial Research

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论,本文构建了政府部门和供应商之间的博弈模型,设计出对称信息和不对称信息两种情况下的电子政务外包激励契约,重点分析了有关变量对激励系数、供应商努力水平、政府部门期望收益的影响关系,在此基础上提出关于供应商选择、激励强度、信息对称性的对策建议,以供决策者参考。Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper built game model between government departments and suppliers,designed the e-government outsourcing incentive contract in such two cases of symmetric information and asymmetric information,focused on analyzing the influencing relationship between the related variables and the incentive coefficient,suppliers′ degree of efforts,government departments′ expected revenue.Based on these,it proposed countermeasure and suggestion about suppliers′ selection,incentive intensity,symmetric information as reference for decision makers.

关 键 词：电子政务外包 政府部门 供应商 委托代理 最优激励契约 

分 类 号：F490.6[经济管理—产业经济]