风险资本投资策略研究述评  

A Review of Studies on Venture Capital Investment Strategy

作　　者：赵海龙[1] 曹湛[1] 范小琪[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江金融职业学院经营管理系,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第5期73-80,共8页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：浙江省社科联课题(2010N66)

摘　　要：风险资本的投资行为和投资效率日益引起学者的关注。在投资过程中,风险资本家会选择不同的投资策略,如垄断投资、混合投资、辛迪加投资和联合投资,并提供重要的增值服务。由于财富约束、风险分担和增值服务的需要,风险资本家经常共同对创业企业投资,因此,传统的委托代理理论分析已不能解释风险投资行为,共同投入和分享产出的团队生产分析对此提供了更好的解释,而且多重代理人之间的信息不对称和重复博弈也成为风险资本投资研究的核心问题。The investment behavior and investment efficiency of venture capital have caused growing attention of scholars. In the investment process, venture capitalists choose different investment strategies, such as the monopoly investment, mixed investment, syndicate investment and joint investment, and provide important value-added services. Because of constraints in wealth, risk sharing and needs for value-added services, venture capitalists often invest on start-ups in collaboration with others. Therefore, the traditional principal-agent theory can not explain the investment behavior of venture capital, and the team production analysis of joint input and output sharing provides better explanation. The asymmetric information and repeated games between muhi-agents have become the core issues of research on venture capital investments.

关 键 词：风险资本 投资策略 风险投资 投资市场 不确定性 投资期权 委托代理理论 团队生产 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]