寡头型一级土地供应、策略互动影响与财政调整——基于282个城市面板数据的动态空间计量  

Oligopolistic Granting of State-owned Land,Strategic interaction and Fiscal Adjustment——Based on a Dynamic Spatial Econometric Model With Urban Panel Data

作　　者：汪冲[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学财政与税务学院,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《财经论丛》2011年第5期32-37,共6页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目;教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(09YJC790137);南京财经大学科研基金资助项目(A2010001)

摘　　要：由土地资源属性和制度决定,国有土地供应出让中形成了受到土地利用规划约束和上级政府管制,由数百个城市＂寡头厂商＂组成的土地一级供应市场,并产生了诸多策略行为和机会主义做法。运用2003~2008年282个城市面板数据的动态空间计量模型,检验了城市政府围绕土地供应指标的策略互动影响及其与土地供应出让纯收益的数量关系,应据此构造目标供应量、实际收益和惩罚三者相结合的＂胡萝卜加大棒＂式重复博弈策略选择空间,以形成激励、约束地方政府改善土地供应的财政调整机制。Constrainted by the properties of land resources and land institutions,the state-owned land granting has formed the primary supply market composed of hundreds of ＂oligopolistic city enterprises＂,which also subject to the land-use planning constraints and regulation of higher level government.This makes the the local government have a number of strategy practices and opportunistic behavior.With a dynamic spatial econometric model based on the panel data of 282 cities in China during the years 2003—2007,the paper examines the strategic interaction among local governments on the relative market share and its quantitative relationship with the land monopoly profits in the process of land granting,and therefore recommends a fiscal adjustment mechanism of the ＂carrot and stick＂ type of repeated game strategy options which has been combined with supply target.The actual benefits and penalties would encourage local governments to improve land supply.

关 键 词：国有土地供应出让 寡头市场 财政调整 空间计量 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学] F812.2