基于博弈模型的企业专利诉讼战略研究  

Study on Enterprise Patent Litigation Strategy Based on Game Model

作　　者：曹勇[1] 黄颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,武汉430074

出　　处：《情报杂志》2011年第9期1-5,19,共6页Journal of Intelligence

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"开放式创新环境下专利效用对企业技术创新绩效的影响机理研究"(编号:71172092);华中科技大学自主创新研究基金项目"企业自主创新行为与知识产权管理的耦合机理"(编号:2010AW021)

摘　　要：在激烈的市场竞争中,越来越多的企业开始采用专利诉讼战略来获得竞争优势。笔者在综述国内外研究现状的基础上,从博弈的视角建立企业专利诉讼的博弈树模型,对企业间的专利诉讼战略进行分析,并重点对专利钓饵的诉讼战略进行论证。结果表明,企业专利诉讼战略的根本动机是通过司法手段,战略性运用专利获得利润最大化。在此基础上,提出了我国企业有效应对专利诉讼国际化、多样化的对策建议。In the fierce market competition, more and more enterprises begin to use the patent litigation strategy to gain competitive advantage. After a backward review of recent research, this paper examines the enterprises＂ patent litigation strategy from a perspective of the game-tree model, especially emphasizes the patent trolls＂ litigation strategy. Results and conclusions show that fundamental motivation of patent litigation is strategic use of patents to maximize profits through the judicial means. We provide countermeasures for china＇s compa- nies to respond effectively to the internationalization and diversification of patent litigation.

关 键 词：专利诉讼 博弈模型 专利钓饵 损害赔偿 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]