基于农业经纪人制度的“农超对接”供应链运作研究  

Connecting agriculture with supermarkets Research on Supply Chain Operation of Connecting Agriculture with Supermarkets Based on Agricultural Brokers System

作　　者：蔡司阳 方炫 王翥 浦徐进 

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《安徽农业科学》2011年第24期15119-15122,共4页Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：2009年"国家大学生创新计划"(091029532)

摘　　要：在概述国内外将博弈论相关知识运用于农产品供应链研究的基础上,运用博弈论中的委托—代理模型,对在"农超对接"的流通模式中超市委托农业经纪人对农产品质量进行监督、控制的这一新职能进行了研究;然后设计了农业经纪人与超市之间的最优激励合同及影响因素,并说明了农业经纪人在流通过程中起到的巨大作用;最后对政府在推动农业经纪人的发展与应用中可发挥的作用提出了建立政府扶持政策、制定相关的行业标准和建立农业经纪人合作组织等相关政策建议。On the basis of expounding the research results of using relevant knowledge about Game Theory for supply chain of agricultural products at home and abroad,we use principal-agent model in Game Theory to research the new function that the supermarkets entrust supervision and control over quality of agricultural products to agricultural brokers in the circulation model of connecting agriculture with supermarkets;then design the optimal incentive contract and influencing factors between agricultural broker and supermarket,and explain the fundamental role of agricultural brokers in the process of circulation;finally in light of the role of government in promoting development and application of agricultural brokers,put forward corresponding policy suggestions： establish government support policy;set relevant standard of industry;establish cooperative organizations of agricultural brokers.

关 键 词：农业经纪人 农超对接 农产品质量 博弈 

分 类 号：F320.1[经济管理—产业经济]