银行规模、俘获行为与监管者声誉关系研究  

An Analysis of the Relationship between Bank Size,Capturing Behavior and Regulator's Reputation

作　　者：刘江会[1] 刘兴堂 

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学商学院,上海200234 [2]新世纪资信评估投资服务有限公司,上海200346

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2011年第5期5-14,共10页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学基金(2005BJL008);上海市教委科研创新项目(08YS76)

摘　　要：通过构建"银行俘获—监管者声誉"模型研究我国银行俘获行为和监管者声誉问题,理论模型的分析表明:在市场集中度较高的银行体系中,具有市场势力的大银行,更有动机和能力俘获金融监管者,并造成了监管者声誉的持续缺失。基于这一理论,本文多角度实证分析了我国银行业的监管俘获和监管者声誉问题,研究结果发现:我国银行监管者不但存在被俘获的现象,而且监管者一旦选择了"屈服",其强硬声誉便会丧失,从而损害监管绩效。在此基础上,提出了强化我国金融监管者声誉、约束银行俘获行为、提升金融监管绩效的相关政策建议。By building a ＂bank capturing regulator＇s reputation＂ model, this paper tries to study such issues as the capturing behavior and the regulator＇s reputation in China＇s banks. The analysis of the theoretical model indicates that in the banking system with a high degree of market concentration, large banks with market forces have more motivation and ability to capture the financial regulators, which re- sults in the continued absence of the regulator＇s reputation. Based on this theory, this paper carries out an empirical analysis of the issues of the capturing behavior and the regulator＇s reputation in China＇s banks from multi-angles, the results indicate that the regulators of China＇s banks have not only become the subjects of capturing but also may lose its tough reputation once the regulators choose to be the ＂sur- render＂ , then the regulatory performance will be damaged. On this basis, it proposes a number of rele- vant policy recommendations in order to strengthen the reputation of China＇s financial regulators, restrict the capturing behavioral of banks, and improve the performance of financial supervision.

关 键 词：银行规模 俘获行为 监管者声誉 监管绩效 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]