不完全契约、非对称信息与合作社经营者激励——农民专业合作社“委托—代理”理论模型的构建及其应用  

Incomplete Contract,Asymmetric Information and Incentive to Cooperative Operators:Construction and Application of Principal-Agent Model of Farmer Cooperatives

作　　者：谭智心[1] 孔祥智[2] 

机构地区：[1]农业部农村经济研究中心 [2]中国人民大学农业与农村发展学院

出　　处：《中国人民大学学报》2011年第5期34-42,共9页Journal of Renmin University of China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"发展农民专业合作组织和完善农村基本经营制度研究"(08&ZD021)

摘　　要：我国农民专业合作社内部的"委托—代理"关系有其自身的特点,通过对符合我国农民专业合作社运行实践的"委托—代理"理论模型的构建及理论分析可知,合作社代理人努力行为的激励与其自身经营农产品占合作社经营农产品总量的比重、对互惠关注的敏感性程度和占有合作社盈余分配的比例等因素存在正相关关系。合作社内部产生"委托—代理"问题的根源在于合作社内部的不完全契约和非对称信息,为避免合作社经营者可能采取的"隐藏信息"和"隐藏行动"的机会主义行为,建议从信号传递和信号甄别的角度对合作社内部的相关契约加以改进。The ＂principal-agent＂ relationship of farmer cooperatives in China has its own characteristics. By building theoretical models and analysis for the ＂principal-agent＂ relationship we know that the incentive for agents to operate cooperatives has positive correlation with the proportion of their own products to the total, the sensitivity of mutual concern and the share of the distribution of surplus. The ＂principal-agent＂ problem of farmer cooperatives roots in the incomplete contracts and asymmetric information. To avoid the opportunistic behavior with ＂hidden information＂ and ＂hidden action＂ of the co-operators, the article suggests contracts be improved from the perspective of information signaling and screening.

关 键 词：不完全契约 非对称信息 激励 “委托-代理”模型 

分 类 号：F321.42[经济管理—产业经济]