从可能到必然——贯穿普兰丁格本体论证明的逻辑之旅  被引量:2

From Possibility to Inevitability——The Logical Links through Plantinga's Ontological Argument

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作  者:张力锋[1] 

机构地区:[1]南京大学现代逻辑与逻辑应用研究所,江苏南京210093

出  处:《学术月刊》2011年第9期51-59,共9页Academic Monthly

基  金:美国基督教哲学家协会-凯尔文大学联合资助项目"普兰丁格的本体论证明及自由意志之辩研究"成果之一

摘  要:普兰丁格使用模态逻辑S5及其可能世界语义学作为论证工具,并运用可能世界、世界索引性质、个体本质和示例等基本哲学概念之间的内在逻辑联系,在辩明极大伟大性、极大美德性及全能、全知和道德完美三者之间关系的基础之上,证明上帝的存在。这一本体论证明的最大贡献在于摆脱了康德式"存在不是谓词"的责难。它不但在形式上是有效的,而且更为形象直观,极大扩展了本质主义学说的内涵。但其主要前提的可靠性并未得到有力证成,至大可能性的模态直觉辩护需要更详尽的澄清,至大的可能性属于相对模态,绝非形而上学模态,二者不可等同视之;它使用的论证工具模态逻辑S5是否正确的形而上学模态逻辑也存在着广泛争议。Alvin Plantinga makes use of modal logic S5 and its possible world semantics as his tools of argument, applies the logical inherent links between the basic philosophical concepts of possible world, world --indexed property, individual essence, instantiation etc, and clarifies the relations between maximal greatness, maximal excellence and omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection. On the basis of the work mentioned above, he argues the existence of God. The most important contribution of the possible--world-- theoretical ontological argument is that it escapes the Kantian rebuke of 'Existence is not a predicate', secondly this argument is not only formally valid, but also more vivid and more intuitional, and finally it greatly extends the connotation of the doctrine of essentialism. But for one thing, the main premise of the argument has no powerful justification; secondly, the modal intuition defense of the possibility of maximal greatness needs more detailed clarification; thirdly, the possibility of maximal greatness is a relative modality and by no means a metaphysical one, hence we must not deal with them in the same manner; finally, whether its argument tool S5 is the correct logic of metaphysical modality is in heated dispute.

关 键 词:上帝 可能世界 个体本质 示例 模态逻辑S5 形而上学模态 认知模态 相对模态 

分 类 号:B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]

 

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