基于信息对称、非对称和风险偏好的委托——代理模型比较  

Comparison of Principal-agent Models Based on Combinations of Risk Preference,Information Symmetric and Information Asymmetric

作　　者：公彦德[1] 李帮义[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院,南京211815 [2]南京航空航天大学,南京210016

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2011年第9期3-9,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金(项目编号:10BGL010);江苏省高校自然科学研究项目资助(项目编号:10KJD120001);教育部人文社科基金(项目编号:09YJC630141;09YJA630064);南京审计学院校重点学科"管理科学与工程"资助

摘　　要：在参与人的风险偏好类型为风险中性或风险规避的前提下,给出了委托人和代理人风险偏好类型的4种组合,在不同的组合下,对对称信息和非对称信息两种情况中的八类委托——代理模型进行求解,通过求解结果对努力水平、分配系数进行了比较和分析,同时分析了委托人的期望效用在不同风险偏好组合下的变化情况。研究表明,对称信息下,无论委托人和代理人的风险偏好如何变化,代理人的努力水平保持不变;若委托人风险偏好类型确定,则代理人风险规避时承担的风险要小于代理人为风险中性时的风险。非对称信息下,只要代理人是风险中性的,则帕累托最优风险分担要求代理人承担完全的风险;若代理人风险规避,则委托人风险中性时代理人的努力水平和分配系数均小于委托人风险规避时代理人的努力水平和分配系数。若代理人是风险中性的,不仅对称信息和非对称信息下代理人的努力水平相等,而且无论委托人风险偏好如何变化,对于每种偏好组合,对称信息下代理人的分配系数均不大于非对称信息。若代理人是风险中性的,则委托人风险偏好的变化并不会改变自身的期望效用;若代理人是风险规避的,则风险中性的委托人期望效用最大。Four types of combinations of risk preference are given about principal and agent on the condition that participants＇ risk preference type is risk- neutral or risk- aversion. Eight kinds of principal- agent model are solved for symmetric information and asymmetric information under different risk combinations. Effort level and distribution coefficient of different risk combinations are all compared, and changes of principal＇s expected utility are analyzed under different risk combinations. Research shows, under the condition of symmetric information, regardless of how the risk preferences of principal and agent change, agent＇s effort level is unchanged; ff principal＇s risk prefexence type is known, agent＇s risk of risk- aversion is less than the risk of risk- neutral. Under asymmetrie information, as long as the agent is risk- neutral, the Pareto optimum risk- sharing requires agents to undertake all risks; if the agent is risk- aversion, when the principal is risk- neutral, the agent＇s effort level and allocation coefficient are all less than the condition when the principal is risk- aversion. If the agent is risk- neutral, net only the agent＇s effort level under symmetric information is equal to the effort level under asymmetric information, but also, no matter how principal＇s risk preference changes, agent＇s distribution coefficient under symmetric informationis not ha＇ger than that under asymmetrie information for every risk preference combinations. If the agent is risk - neutral, the principal＇s expected utility is unchanged even ff its risk preference is changed; if the agent is risk- aversion, the principal of risk- neutral can have the maximum expected utility.

关 键 词：委托——代理 风险偏好组合 对称信息 非对称信息 

分 类 号：F490.5[经济管理—产业经济]