建设监理多任务委托代理模型  

Multi-task principal-agent relationships model for construction supervision

作　　者：李红波[1] 赖应良[1] 刘亚丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学建筑工程学院,云南昆明650500

出　　处：《西安建筑科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第5期660-664,共5页Journal of Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：云南省自然科学基金资助项目(2008ZC029M)

摘　　要：建设监理合同决定了业主与监理方之间的委托—代理关系.建设监理利用信息优势隐匿真实的努力水平,存在损害业主利益的"道德风险".为实现监理任务多个控制目标之间的协调均衡实现,借助多任务委托代理最优合同模型,分析了监理任务被观测的难易程度、建设监理努力边际成本的关联性和风险规避度对激励强度的影响,进而制定了激励组合策略:①业主在对工程监理实施客观绩效评价,同时引进主观绩效评价;②根据监理人的特质选择监理工程师;③监理合同期划分为若干观测期,监理过程引入竞争机制;④将多任务间努力成本的替代性转化为互补性.The proprietor and supervisors establish principal-agent relationships by construction supervision contract, con- struction supervisor obscures the effort advantage in information, and may bring about moral hazard damages to the inter- ests of principal. In order to coordinate and improve multi-objective supervision tasks, by multi-task principal-agent opti- mal contract model, the paper indicated that the observable contributions and marginal cost of supervisors＇ efforts and their coefficient of risk aversion may affect incentive intensity. The incentive strategies portfolio are as following： （D to assess both the objective and subjective performance of supervisors＇ effort, ~） to select supervisors by characteristics, （~） to adopt construction contract periods and introduce competition mechanisms in process of supervision, （~） to translate al- ternation of multi-task effort cost into its complementation.

关 键 词：建设监理 多任务委托代理 激励机制设计 

分 类 号：TU201[建筑科学—建筑设计及理论]