基于信号传递模型的企业投资短视与敲竹杠长期投资行为分析  

The Analysis of Corporate Investment Myopia and Holdup Permanent Investment Behaviors Based on the Signaling Game Model

作　　者：郝艳[1,2] 李秉祥[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学工商管理学院,陕西西安710054 [2]西北政法大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710063

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2011年第3期19-23,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872092);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(200807000009);教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(09YJA630130);西北政法大学校级优秀青年人才资助项目(09XJC023)

摘　　要：采用信号传递模型对投资短视和敲竹杠长期投资两种非效率投资行为进行均衡分析发现:在面临长短期投资决策时,经理仅依据项目的选择无法向股东传递自己的类型信息,因此如果不具备与股东谈判的能力,经理会选择短期项目以巩固自己的职位,如果此时短期项目的净现金流量较低则出现投资短视类型的非效率投资行为;如果具备与股东谈判的能力,经理会选择长期项目使得股东无法在长期项目收益实现之前解雇自己,如果此时长期项目的净现金流量较低则出现敲竹杠长期投资类型的非效率投资行为。分析还表明,适度的惩罚和激励都有助于减少经理的投资短视行为;但是只有适度的激励才有助于减少经理的敲竹杠长期投资行为。Both investment myopia and holdup permanent investment are inefficient investment behaviors because they choose projects based on the lower net present value（NPV）.A major difference between these two behaviors is that the former investment behavior chooses short-term projects and the latter behavior chooses long-term projects.To better understand the relationship between these two inefficient investment behaviors,we build a signaling game model by incorporating their behavioral characteristics and differences. First,we briefly introduce the meanings and research results of corporate investment myopia and holdup permanent investment behaviors.Second,the research hypotheses are proposed.Third,we build a signaling game model to assist short-term and long-term investment decisions.Fourth,we analyze all kinds of game equilibriums.Last,we discuss the analysis results and make conclusions.Our research findings show that if a manager does not have the ability to negotiate with shareholders he will choose short-term projects.A manager＇s investment behavior is inefficient and belongs to the investment myopia type if short-term projects have lower net present values（NPV）.A manager will choose long-term projects if he can negotiate with shareholders and shareholders cannot layoff the manager before long-term project profits are realized. The game equilibrium analysis results indicate that penalty and incentives can reduce a manager＇s investment myopia behaviors.However,only incentives can help reduce a manager＇s holdup permanent investment behaviors.

关 键 词：投资短视 敲竹杠长期投资 管理防御 信号传递模型 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]