弹性需求下交通BOT项目特许期决策  

Decision-Making on Concession Period for Traffic BOT Project under Elastic Demand

作　　者：王东波[1] 宋金波[1] 戴大双[1] 李铮[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2011年第3期116-122,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70702033;71072107)

摘　　要：为解决弹性需求条件下的特许期决策问题,本文以交通BOT项目为研究对象,以实现政府社会消费者总剩余最大化与项目公司收益净现值最大化为决策目标,构建了完全信息动态博弈模型。求解出模型的精炼纳什均衡解,针对均衡解的性质展开讨论,从价格弹性视角分析了交通量需求变动对特许期决策的影响。最后,通过算例对特许期决策模型和均衡解的性质进行了验证。Recently,BOT（build-operate-transfer） which could relieve the government＇s financial burden and improve operating efficiency becomes an important method to operate the traffic infrastructure projects,and related researches of decision-making on concession period for traffic BOT project rapidly attract broad attention of both academic and practical field.The existing decision-making models of concession period usually ignore the price elasticity of traffic demand.In fact,traffic demand varies with the price and further affects the decision-making on concession period under the circumstances of multiple parallel toll roads in the same area or multiple toll bridges on the same river.Therefore,it is necessary to consider the price elasticity of traffic demand while making decision on concession period for traffic BOT projects.In the first part,the research takes traffic BOT projects as research subject,and develops a dynamic game model of complete information with several hypotheses to maximize government＇s total consumer surplus and to maximize project company＇s net present value of revenue respectively.In the second part,the backward induction is used to solve the perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the model,and the government＇s optimal choice of concession period and project company＇s optimal choice of concession price are achieved.……In the third part,three properties of the equilibrium solution are concluded,and the effects of traffic demand variation on concession period＇s decision-making are analyzed from the price elasticity point of view.If the traffic demand function is given,the optimal concession period and optimal concession price exist under the condition that the absolute value of price elasticity of traffic demand is greater than one;if other parameters are fixed,the concession period extends with the construction cost＇s increase,and the concession price decreases with the construction cost＇s increase;if the traffic capacity and construction standards are given,an upper limit o

关 键 词：BOT 特许期 弹性需求 

分 类 号：F224.5[经济管理—国民经济]