资源控制权与审计师轮换的治理效应  

Client Resource Control and Quality Effects of Auditor Rotation

作　　者：龚启辉[1] 李志军[2] 王善平[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,邮政编码100871 [2]湖南大学

出　　处：《审计研究》2011年第5期73-81,共9页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家社科基金(08BJY025);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-06-0703)的资助

摘　　要：审计师轮换是构建独立审计秩序化格局以防范会计舞弊的重要监管手段。本文基于会计师事务所内部治理尤其是资源整合的角度研究了审计师轮换对审计质量的影响,结果发现,审计师轮换后,会计师事务所出具非标意见的概率显著上升,高客户资源控制权个人化会计师事务所显著抑制了公司的正向盈余管理水平;高客户资源控制权个人化会计师事务所在审计师轮换后抑制公司正向盈余管理水平的提高幅度大于低客户资源控制权个人化会计师事务所。结果表明,审计师轮换提高了审计独立性和审计质量,有助于实现客户资源控制权个人化向会计师事务所化的转变。As one of the important regulatory tool, auditor rotation was applied to prevent accounting fraud and construct the orderly pattern of audit market. This paper finds that the probability of quality opinion significantly increased after rotation and the level of positive accrual decreased for high client resource control firms after rotation. More importantly, the extent of decreased positive accrual is larger for high client resource control firms than low client resource control firms. Therefore, this paper demonstrates that auditor rotation contributes to transform the discrete POE human capital of CPAs to the integration of accounting firm＇s organizational capital and CPAs＇ POE human capital and increases the audit independence and audit quality.

关 键 词：审计师轮换 资源控制权 审计意见 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学]