后金融危机时代IMF总裁选任制度改革的国际法思考  

Some Thoughts on the Reform of Selection Rules for Managing Director of the IMF in the Post-Financial Crisis Era from the Perspective of International Law

作　　者：余锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学法学院

出　　处：《安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2011年第4期104-110,共7页Journal of Anhui University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：2009年度教育部人文社科基金项目(09XJC820015);2009~2010年度美国Freeman Fellow Program资助项目

摘　　要：总裁在IMF的治理结构中扮演着重要的角色,但IMF总裁选任规则的缺陷与不足却未得到恰当的纠正和补足,IMF之职能与目标的实现亦因此而受到阻碍。IMF、发展中国家、发达国家以及非政府组织对改革IMF总裁选举规则提出的意见和建议,应在实践的基础上予以进一步完善,以打破"任人唯亲"的"欧洲传统",建立"任人唯贤"的IMF总裁选拔机制,提升发展中国家国民参与IMF管理工作的广度与深度,真正实现成员方共治IMF。The Managing Director(MD)plays an important role in the governance structure of IMF.However,the rules concerning the selection of MD have demerits and flaws,calling for adjustment and amendment.Otherwise,the function and goals of IMF cannot be realized because of aforesaid reasons.IMF,developing and developed countries and NGOs have made many proposals on how to reform the rules for the selection of MD,which need to be improved on the basis of practice.Thus,the kinshipbased European convention can be broken and a merit-based mechanism for the selection of MD can be established.Then China and other developing countries as members of the IMF can play a more important role in co-governance.

关 键 词：IMF 总裁选任 国际组织 全球共治 欧洲传统 

分 类 号：D99[政治法律—国际法学]