业绩承诺与上市公司盈余管理——以股权分置改革中的管制为例  

Performance Commitments and Earnings Management of Listed Companies:Taking Supervision in the Split-share Reform for Example

作　　者：刘浩[1,2] 杨尔稼[2] 麻樟城 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433 [2]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433 [3]海通证券股份有限公司,上海200001

出　　处：《财经研究》2011年第10期58-69,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802035);国家社会科学基金资助项目(11CGL017);教育部重点研究基地重大项目(07JJD630007);财政部"全国会计领军(学术类)后备人才培训项目";上海财经大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目的资助

摘　　要：与以往对国内上市公司盈余管理的动机研究主要集中于IPO、再融资和扭亏等不同,文章以股权分置改革中业绩承诺公司为样本,试图探讨我国上市公司盈余管理的新动因——业绩承诺。研究发现:(1)业绩承诺公司存在调高利润的盈余管理行为,在盈余管理方法选择上倾向于采用非经常性交易;(2)在业绩承诺无法实现时,民营企业的大股东向小股东追送股份越多,上市公司盈余管理越严重。文章研究的实践意义在于:虽然股权分置改革已经结束,但是证监会对于上市公司在重大资产重组中要求业绩承诺的偏好不断加强,管制可能持续诱发上市公司新的盈余管理。Previous studies on domestic listed companies＇ motivation for earnings management focus on IPO, refinancing and the reverse of losses and so on. And this paper tries to discuss the new motivation for earnings management, namely performance commitments, based on the sample of companies which have made performance commitments during the split-share reform. It finds that： firstly, companies which have made performance commitments have the earnings management behavior of increasing profits, and are apt to apply non-routine transactions to increase profits; secondly, main- ly in private companies, when the performance commitments cannot be realized, the more shares re-allotted to minority shareholders by large shareholders result in more severe earnings management. This paper provides practical meanings that, although the split-share reform has finished, the preference of China Securities Regulatory Commission for performance commitments of listed companies made in major asset restructuring is constantly enhancing and supervision may continuously give rise to new earnings management of listed companies.

关 键 词：业绩承诺 盈余管理 股权分置改革 

分 类 号：F231.5[经济管理—会计学]