财政收入集权增加了基层政府公共服务支出吗? 以河南省减免农业税为例  

Does Fiscal Centralization Increase Local Government Expenditure on Public Services? Evidence from Exemption of Agriculture Taxes in Henan Province

作　　者：左翔[1] 殷醒民[2] 潘孝挺[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外贸易学院国际经贸学院 [2]复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心 [3]上海财经大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2011年第3期1349-1374,共26页China Economic Quarterly

摘　　要：很多研究表明，中国式分权导致了地方政府财政支出结构偏重基础设施建设，忽视公共服务和人力资本投入。免征农业税和相应的转移支付降低了基层政府的财政独立性，其影响与上述政策结果相似。利用河南省108个县级单位2001—2008年的面板数据，本文对减免农业税后的财政支出进行了实证检验，发现受到免征农业税影响较大的县农业支出显著增加，对教育的投入显著下降。由于前者主要是由“新农村建设”等政策压力造成的，这说明财政收入集权强化了那些易于考核的政策目标的执行力度。Studies have shown that Chinese-style decentralization causes local governments＇ emphasizing on infrastructure construction and neglecting public services and human capital investment. Exemption of agricultural taxes reduces local fiscal autonomy, so its impact is similar to the above policy proposals. Using this exogenous shock and 108 coun- ty-level panel data （2001--2008） of Henan province, this paper estimates the causal effect of exemption of agriculture taxes on fiscal expenditure and finds that counties under large im- pacts increases expenditure on agriculture significantly and decreases expenditure on education significantly. Since the former is caused by the ＂New Countryside Construction＂ and other political pressures, the results show that fiscal centralization strengthens the local government＇s efforts to policy objectives which can be easily assessed.

关 键 词：财政收入集权 减免农业税 财政支出结构 双重差分 多任务委托-代理 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] F224