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作 者:乔岳[1]
机构地区:[1]山东大学经济学院
出 处:《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2011年第5期8-17,共10页Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
摘 要:司法的总体目标是实现公平与正义,然而,在我国有限的司法资源条件下,司法制度设计不得不考虑公平与正义的成本。司法成本过高会成为司法可及性的障碍。如何平衡公平、正义与成本,于是成为了制度设计的重点和难点之一。从律师收费制度的视角,应用法经济学的方法,通过建立诉讼的动态博弈模型,定量比较和分析了我国当前的各种律师收费制度对公平、正义和司法成本的影响;并通过数据模拟,探讨了律师收费制度设计中应注意解决和避免的问题,这为司法制度的设计提供了分析思路。结论也进一步修正了前期理论研究成果,从而解决了律师收费研究中理论推理与实证结论不一致的问题。To achieve equality and justice is the main objective of China's judicial reform.However,due to the scarcity of judicial resources in China,the cost of achieving equality and justice must be considered when designing the judicial system.Thus,how to balance equality,justice and judicial costs has become one of the most complicated questions.Analysis of the legal fee system provides a unique perspective for this question.In this paper,we use the method of law and economics to analyze this question.Through setting up a dynamic game model for litigation,we compare the effects of different legal fee systems on equality,justice and the social cost.Through data simulation,our theoretical findings are interpreted intuitively.The paper also scrutinizes institutional factors in system designing,which provides useful implications for the judicial reform.In addition,our research findings have amended the inconsistence of results between theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence.
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