废旧汽车逆向物流回收模式的研究  

A Study on Different Take-Back Modes for End-of-Life Vehicle Reverse Logistics

作　　者：张玲[1,2] 潘晓弘[1] 王正肖[1] 董天阳[3] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学现代制造工程研究所,杭州310027 [2]浙江科技学院经济管理学院,杭州310023 [3]浙江工业大学计算机学院,杭州310032

出　　处：《汽车工程》2011年第9期823-828,共6页Automotive Engineering

基　　金：国家863高技术研究发展计划项目(2009AA04Z151);浙江省重大科技专项优先主题项目(2008C01060-4);浙江省教育厅科研项目(Y201018445)资助

摘　　要：针对废旧汽车逆向物流的特点,分析了制造商、零售商和第三方3种不同市场的回收模式,并对不同回收模式提出了双边垄断市场结构下废旧汽车回收决策的双层规划模型。模型中考虑了由于再制造成本的不确定性所带来的风险,在Stackelberg博弈框架下对模型求解和分析。针对3种参与者的不同回收投资效率,对各回收模式的最优均衡零售价、回收率、批发价和供应链各成员利润进行了比较,并通过算例验证。结果表明,供应链各方回收投资效率不同时,第三方回收模式对回收投资效率的要求最高;回收投资效率相同时,宜优先选择零售商回收模式。Based on the features of end-of-life vehicle（ELV） reverse logistics,the take-back modes in manufacturer,retailer and third party three different ELV markets are analyzed,and the two-layer programming models under bilateral monopoly market structure for different take-back modes are proposed,taking into account the risk caused by remanufacturing cost uncertainty.The models are solved and analyzed under the framework of Stackelberg game.According to the take-back investment efficiency of three different partners,the optimal equilibrium retail prices,product return rates,wholesale prices and the profits of each channel member for each take-back mode are compared,which is then verified by a sample case.The results show that third-party take-back mode requires the highest take-back investment efficiency when the take-back investment efficiencies of three supply chain partners are different and retailer take-back mode is preferred in the case of same investment efficiency for three partners.

关 键 词：废旧汽车 再制造 逆向物流 回收模式 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F426.471[经济管理—产业经济] F713.2F224