供应链整合创新的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Integration and Innovation

作　　者：刘金芳[1] 徐枞巍[1,2] 高波[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经济管理学院,北京100191 [2]合肥工业大学,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《系统工程》2011年第8期8-13,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901023)

摘　　要：供应链整合创新是企业实现利益最大化的一条重要途径。本文就"双寡头企业是否选择供应链整合创新"问题,从成本收益角度建立演化博弈模型,分析两企业策略的动态演化过程及稳定状态。理论分析和数值模拟的结果表明:博弈过程中,企业策略的动态演化过程是否受竞争对手影响,取决于其供应链的整合成本、整合收益、超额收益和潜在损失,与竞争对手的这四个因素无关,也与两企业的原有收益无关;两企业策略相互影响时,存在两类不同的稳定状态。Supply chain integration and innovation is an important approach to maximize the benefits of enterprises.In this paper,we study the problem on whether double oligarchies choose supply chain integration and innovation or not.The model of evolutionary game was established from cost-benefit point of view,and the process and steady station of evolution was analysed.Results of theoretical analysis and numerical simulation show that the dynamic process of evolution of enterprise strategy depends on its costs,benefits,excess returns and potential losses of supply chain integration and innovation,while it is not influenced by these four factors of competitors,nor is it related the original profits of double oligarchies.Furthermore,the results suggest that the strategy of double oligarchies have two different stable states when their strategies interact with each other.

关 键 词：运筹学 供应链整合 演化博弈 双寡头 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]