有限合作博弈的Shapley分配  

The Shapley Value for Restricted Cooperative Games

作　　者：李书金[1] 郦晓宁[2] 

机构地区：[1]中央司法警官学院研究所,河北保定071000 [2]中央司法警官学院劳教管理系,河北保定071000

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2011年第19期206-215,共10页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于可信性理论的动态投资组合模型及决策研究"(70871011)

摘　　要：以Myerson关于有限合作的图博弈模型为基础,结合经典合作博弈的相关结论,建立了有限合作博弈的Shapley分配,讨论了分配的相关性质.同时在支付函数满足链递增性的假设下,进一步研究了有限合作关系变化对收益分配的影响,给出了相关的研究结论.Based on the model of restricted cooperative games established by Myerson and the conclusions relative to crisp cooperative games, the Shapley value for restricted cooper- ative games is proposed, and the related properties are proved as well. On the assumption that payoff function increase as the links get more, influences to the allocation of profit is analyzed,and the research conclusions are given.

关 键 词：有限合作博弈 SHAPLEY值 递增支付 链 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]