竞争关系下制造商专项投资对分销商机会主义行为的影响  

The Impact of Manufacturer's Specific Investments on Distributor's Opportunism under the Condition of a Competitive Relationship

作　　者：薛佳奇[1] 刘益[2] 张磊楠[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029 [2]上海交通大学安泰管理学院,上海200044

出　　处：《管理评论》2011年第9期76-85,共10页Management Review

基　　金：对外经济贸易大学科研启动基金项目(09QD19);国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(71102079);国家自然科学基金项目(70872090);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630245)

摘　　要：以往研究仅关注了一对交易关系中,制造商专项投资对分销商机会主义行为的影响。本文引入制造商的竞争者,探讨了制造商与其竞争者专项投资水平的不对等对上述关系的调节作用。通过对家电行业276对制造商与分销商关系的实证研究发现:投入专项资产的制造商会采取吸收分销商专项投资的方式抑制其机会主义行为的发生。当制造商的竞争者也对分销商进行专项投资时,制造商与竞争者专项投资的不对等性明显改变了制造商专项投资对分销商机会主义行为的作用效果。本文的研究结论对于面临激烈竞争的制造商合理制定投资决策,减少分销商机会主义行为的侵害具有重要的理论和实践意义。Previous literatures only examine the relationships between manufacturer＇s specific investments（MSI）,distributor＇s specific investments（DSI） and distributor＇s opportunism（DO） in a pair of trade relationship.Considering the manufacturer＇s competitor,this study explores the moderating effect of specific investments asymmetry between a manufacturer and its competitor on the relationships mentioned above.The survey on 267 pairs of manufacturer-distributor relationships in Chinese household appliance industry finds that a manufacturer which makes specific investments in the relationship can restrain its DO through absorbing the DSI.As the manufacturer＇s competitor also invests in the relationship with the distributor,specific investments asymmetry between the manufacturer and its competitor significantly changes the impact of MSI on DO.These conclusions have theoretical and practical implications for manufacturers in the competitive environment to make reasonable investing decisions,and to effectively control distributor＇s opportunism.

关 键 词：竞争关系 目标关系 专项投资 机会主义行为 

分 类 号：F426.6[经济管理—产业经济] F274F224