高校考试诚信的博弈模型  

Good faith game model in college examination

作　　者：曹黎侠[1] 陈江波[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安工业大学理学院,西安710032

出　　处：《西南民族大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第5期699-702,共4页Journal of Southwest Minzu University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：陕西省教育厅科学计划项目自然专项(09JK480);西安工业大学教学改革项目(10JGY28)

摘　　要：对当前高校大学生考试现状分析的基础之上,建立了高校大学生考试诚信的博弈模型,并给出了混合策略下的纳什均衡点;从而确定了在模型假设条件成立的前提下,局中人监考教师与学生的均衡解;最后通过对博弈结果的分析,给出了降低"学生的作弊概率"和"教师认真监考概率"的一些有效的建议;该博弈结果符合高校当前考试制度改革的现状,具有一定的现实意义.Based on status of the analysis examination of college students,this paper establishes the game model for college student good faith in examination,and gives the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium point.Under the assumptions in the model,this paper sets up the equilibrium solution premise of the player examiners of teachers and students,analyses the results through the game,and gives some effective recommendations to produce ＂probability of student cheating＂ and ＂teachers seriously examiner probability＂.The game results are in line with the reform of university status of the current examination system,and has a certain practical significance.

关 键 词：考试诚信 博弈 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]