评级机构丧失信托责任的逻辑演进  

Logic Evolution of Rating Agencies Lose Fiduciary Duty

作　　者：赵瑾璐[1] 张源[2] 赵磊[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学人文社会与科学学院,北京100081 [2]中国建筑股份有限公司基础设施事业部,北京100048 [3]中国建筑股份有限公司城市综合建设部,北京100037

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第5期12-15,20,共5页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：山东省社会科学基金重点资助项目(10BJGJO4)

摘　　要：失去外部有效制衡监管的评级机构在发行方付费模式,收入来源受制于评级对象,跟踪评级预警能力滞后面前屈服于职业操守,虚评、假评、盲评成为合乎利益情理的评级准则。且政策特权捍卫和巩固三大评级巨头的霸主地位,集市场评判员和利益分享者于一身。为此,必须强化评级机构的市场化信托责任,一要实施培育与监管并重的发展原则;二要继续推进评级业的市场化水平;三要加强跟踪评级和规避利益冲突的机制建设。Rating agencies losing effective monitoring in checks and balances from the external are subject to the rating objects in terms of paying model.The early warning capability in relation to tracking and rating lags currently and yields to professional conduct.Virtual,false and blind ratings become reasonable as well as sensible rating criteria.And the hegemony in which policy privilege defends and consolidates the three giant rating agencies is integrated into roles of market judges and interest sharers.Therefore,the market fiduciary duty of rating agencies should be strengthened：（1）To implement developing principles of attaching equal importance on breeding and supervising;（2）to continue pushing the marketization of the rating industry;（3）to reinforce mechanism construction of tracking ratings and avoiding interest conflicts.

关 键 词：评级机构 信托责任 利益驱使 政策特权 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]