农户融资需求与对策的静态博弈分析  

Farmers' Financing Requirements and Countermeasures by Static Game Theory

作　　者：陈曦[1] 王景新[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江师范大学农村研究中心,浙江金华321004

出　　处：《江西农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第3期34-40,共7页Journal of Jianxi Agricultural University :Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(10AJY008)

摘　　要：农户贷款难、融资需求不足给农户的农业生产生活产生了巨大的制约。目前农村金融市场供需呈现多元化,不同农户面对不同的金融需求会选择符合自身的金融主体。不同的金融主体基于自身利益的考虑也会选择不同的借款者。通过研究正规金融和非正规金融与农户的静态博弈来找出资金供需的最优抉择。根据对浙江省资金互助社的实地调研,结合相关金融政策提出破解贫穷农户融资难的相关对策和方法。It is the difficulties in loan and the shortage in financing demand that restrict agricultural production and farmers＇ life.As current supply of rural financial market is multi-facetted,different farmers facing different financial demand will choose suitable financial subject for themselves.Meanwhile,different financial subject,based on their own interests,also can choose different borrowers.The paper studies the static game between both the formal and non-formal finance and farmers to find out the optimal choice of supply and demand of funds.Based on the investigation of mutual cooperatives in Zhejiang Province in conjunction with the relevant financial policy,it proposed related countermeasures and methods to resolve low-income households＇ difficulty of financing

关 键 词：融资 正规金融 非正规金融 资金互助社 

分 类 号：F830.6[经济管理—金融学]