活立木交易的最优拍卖竞价研究——基于买方估价和两人竞购的视角  

Optimal Auction Bidding Advantages of Stumpage Transactions——Based on Buyer's Valuation and Both Bid

作　　者：黄颖利[1] 朱博[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北林业大学经济管理学院,哈尔滨150040

出　　处：《林业经济问题》2011年第4期288-293,共6页Issues of Forestry Economics

摘　　要：首先阐述了活立木现行交易的基本方式和在交易中活立木定价失真的缺陷,其次通过分析拍卖的优势提出活立木交易中拍卖定价方式。接着介绍了活立木交易中的主体,同时分析了竞买人双方在不同博弈策略和估价策略下的收益。在此基础上建立两人竞购的最优拍卖机制,以简单的概率分析描述竞买人的决策,以买方估价和最大化卖方的期望收益为前提,确定交易价格,得出最优拍卖竞价使得买方总期望收益的增长、使交易公开透明、物品配置合理等优势。This article expounds on current stumpage transaction and defects of stumpage pricing distortion by the transaction,also proposes auction pricing in stumpage transactions by analyzing the advantages of the auction.Then it introduces the market entities,and gives analysis of both bidders＇ gains in different game strategies and bidders＇ valuations.On the basis of above,it builds the optimal auction mechanism by two bidders,with a simple description of probability analysis for bidders＇ decisions,based on the bidders＇ valuation and the seller maximizing expected revenue,which comes to the stumpage price and concludes that optimal auction bidding brings the growth of bidders＇total expected revenue and other advantages.

关 键 词：活立木定价 博弈分析 两人竞购 买方估价 最优拍卖竞价优势 

分 类 号：F326.22[经济管理—产业经济]