信息对称悖论与中小企业融资行为  

Information Symmetry Paradox and SME Financing Behavior

作　　者：孙林[1] 杨俊[1] 邵传林[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,400043 [2]西北大学经济管理学院,710127

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2011年第10期29-39,共11页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70703038);全国教育科学规划课题(EFA080248)的资助

摘　　要：由于银行与中小企业之间信息不对称以及大银行对规模效应的要求,中小企业的融资难问题至今未能化解。本文为近年来我国民间兴起的中小企业互助融资模式构建了一个数理模型。理论分析表明:第一,银企之间存在信息对称悖论,也即银行一味要求企业提供完全信息,会导致双亏;适度信息不对称则能实现双赢;第二,一定条件下,企业房屋、设备等实物类硬资本与经营能力、财务状况、历史信用等信息类软资本之间具有替代关系;第三,中小企业通过互助融资模式能拆借到所需的软硬资本,并能根据意愿隐匿财务信息,从而有利于它们的生存和发展;此外,中小企业还能通过集体这个"最后借款人"增加资信等级,并使银行调高收益预期,从而最终可实现交换的帕累托最优。Due to information asymmetry between the bank and SME as well as the Bank＇s requirement for scale effect,the problems of SME＇s financing are not very well be solved.The paper develops a mathematical model in order to provide theoretical basis for the phenomenon of SME＇s mutual Financing in Chinese folk in recent years.The research shows that,（1） There exists information symmetry paradox between bank and SME,that is,if bank requires for complete information symmetry,it will lead to loss-loss,or it will achieve win-win;（2）Under certain condition,the hard capital,such as housing,equipment,etc and soft capital,such as management ability,financial position,credit history,etc can substitute mutually;（3）The second,SME can borrow the required hard capital or soft one through mutual aid mode,and make its information internal according to it＇s desire,so that it can survive and develop better.Besides,SME can increase credit rating through the ＂last borrower＂ collective,and Banks to reset to higher yields,thus finally can realize the exchange of Pareto optimality.

关 键 词：信息不对称 互助融资 中小企业融资 

分 类 号：F222.3[经济管理—国民经济]