基于零售商私有信息的分销系统协调  

Coordinating a distribution system with retailer-reporting

作　　者：翟昕[1] 刘忠轶[1] 吴江华[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871 [2]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2011年第10期1903-1911,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70801001;70701037);中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金)(10XNJ042)

摘　　要：研究了采用动态分配策略和固定路线运输策略的单供应商多零售商分销系统.具体研究两种分销系统:a.供应商实时监控零售商库存水平并依据此信息作决策;b.供应商依赖零售商自行汇报的库存水平作决策.证明在b系统下,讲实话不是零售商最优策略,且b系统期望成本严格大于a系统.为使b系统获得与a系统相同的期望成本,研究如何激励零售商讲实话.由于采用动态分配策略,系统涉及不止一次的库存决策,因而每个零售商均有不止一次的机会虚报库存以最小化自己的期望成本.研究的贡献在于通过一次转移支付解决了零售商多次虚报问题,使得零售商讲实话成为贝氏均衡;同时最小化了系统及各零售商的期望成本.This paper studies a distribution system consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers under dynamic allocation policy and static routing policy.The system is managed under two different information scenarios：in scenario（a） the supplier has access to each retailer＇s inventory level in real time and makes system replenishment and allocation decisions based on these accurate data;and in scenario（b） the supplier has no access to retailers＇ inventory data but makes system replenishment and allocation decisions based on the information reported by the retailers at times of system replenishment and each allocation.The results show that under scenario（b）,retailers will never truthfully report their inventory levels to the supplier at the time of either system replenishment or allocation.In addition,system expected cost under scenario（b） is strictly higher than that under scenario（a）.To achieve the lower system expected cost in scenario（b）, we propose an incentive compatible mechanism with a one-time transfer payment which makes truth-telling Bayesian equilibrium for the retailers at times of both system replenishment and allocation.

关 键 词：供应链协调 机制设计 转移支付 贝氏均衡 

分 类 号：C935[经济管理—管理学] N949[自然科学总论—系统科学]