我国制造商应对外资强势零售商的合作广告策略  

A Cooperative Advertising Strategy of Chinese Manufacturer Response to Dominant Foreign Capital Retailer

作　　者：曹梅[1,2] 李烨[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]贵州大学管理学院,贵州贵阳550025 [2]贵州大学企业创新与发展研究所,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2011年第12期113-117,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：贵州大学青年科学基金项目(2008196)

摘　　要：文章研究了在外资强势零售商对我国零售业强烈冲击下,制造商应对强势零售商的合作广告策略。文章运用Hotelling模型建立了一个我国制造商和零售商合作广告模型,并运用Stackelberg博弈得到了模型的Nash均衡。研究发现,合作广告策略下强势零售商的利润下降的同时,制造商的利润提高了,但我国零售商的利润下降了。同时还发现,合作广告存在的条件是相对于强势零售商我国零售商的差异化适中,过小的差异化会造成竞争加剧,而过大的差异化会造成强势零售商更大的竞争优势。This paper studies cooperative advertising between Chinese manufacturer and weak retailer in response to the competing foreign capital retailers. A cooperative advertising model is developed with Hotelling model and Nash equilibrium of the model is obtained. The result shows that the profit of the dominant retailer decreases and the profit of the manufacturer increases. However, the profit of the weak retailer decreases. This paper also shows that moderate discrepancy between the dominant retailer and the weak retailer is a necessary condition which the cooperative advertising exists. Competition between the dominant retailer and the weak retailer would increase with little discrepancy, and the dominant retailer would get much competing advantages with large discrepancy.

关 键 词：零售商 制造商 合作广告 定价 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F120[经济管理—世界经济]