我国高、中考志愿填报方式的博弈分析  

A Game-theoretic Analysis of the College Admission Mechanism in China

作　　者：郑碧霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]福州职业技术学院,福建福州350001

出　　处：《漳州师范学院学报（自然科学版）》2011年第3期109-117,共9页Journal of ZhangZhou Teachers College（Natural Science)

基　　金：福建省教育厅社科项目(K36006)

摘　　要：不言而喻,我国中考与高考录取机制对人才选拔和培养影响至深.本文运用博弈模型主要考察了录取模式中的考前报、估分报和知分报三种不同的志愿填报方式的效率性问题,指出若以资源的社会最优配置为评价标准,三种方式从优到劣依次为:考前报,知分报,估分报.同时,本文讨论了理论分析结果与现实录取情况的吻合性、探讨了存在差异的主要原因,并进一步拓展讨论了"平行志愿"录取方式,提出了相关改革建议.This paper studies the social efficiency of the existing three college admission mechanisms in China,i.e.applying before exam,after exam yet before score announcement,and after score announcement.All the Nash equilibrium in our models are analyzed,then we show that measured by probability of matching which can be used to compare the three mechanisms,the first mechanism is the optimal,and the second is the most ineffective one.Furthermore,we extend our model to discuss the gap between the theory and the reality.Suggestions on the reform of China＇s college admission mechanism are thus proposed.

关 键 词：录取机制 博弈 效率 匹配概率 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]