隐性知识转移过程中个体间的博弈纳什均衡  

Person-to-person Nash Game Equilibrium in the Tacit Knowledge Transfer Process

作　　者：朱卫未[1] 施琴芬[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学经济与管理学院,南京210003 [2]南京邮电大学科技处,南京210003

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2011年第5期128-134,共7页R&D Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70773080)

摘　　要：针对隐性知识的特征和隐性知识主体在隐性知识的共享和交流中决策的特点,建立了基于理性选择的隐性知识转移决策模型.在此基础上,求出隐性知识主体共享决策时的博弈纳什均衡.模型揭示了隐性知识转移和共享过程中价值增值的来源,同时也指出在没有第三方干扰的情况下,虽然隐性知识主体扩大共享能够进一步提高双方知识创新的结果,但经过权衡,双方都会选择较为理性的知识价值进行共享.From the characteristics of tacit knowledge, and the decision features of the subjects in the share and communication process of tacit knowledge, it proposes a decision model of tacit knowledge transfer based on rational choice, and figures out the Nash game equilibrium when the subjects of tacit knowledge make the share decision. The model reveals the source of added value during the transfer and share process of tacit knowledge, and it also points out that although it will increase the knowledge innovation value when those subjects expand their sharing knowledge, both sides will choose a rational level after consideration when there is no third party.

关 键 词：隐性知识 转移 博弈模型 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学]