中国地方政府的财政支出与财政效率竞争  

The Competition of Fiscal Expenditure and Fiscal Efficiency between Local Governments in China

作　　者：才国伟[1] 钱金保[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院 [2]华南理工大学经济与贸易学院

出　　处：《统计研究》2011年第10期36-46,共11页Statistical Research

基　　金：教育部人文社科项目(09YJC790264);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(10wkpy19)(09pywk18);广东省优秀博士论文专项基金;广东高校优秀青年创新人才培育项目(wym09010)的资助

摘　　要：现有文献大都讨论地方政府之间的财政支出竞争,而忽视了它们之间的财政效率竞争,以及两者之间竞争模式的差异。本文首先使用数据包络法测算了我国209个地级市的财政效率,然后运用空间计量模型对比分析了财政支出和财政效率的空间竞争模式。结果发现,地方政府的财政支出和财政效率都存在竞争,但是两者的竞争模式截然不同。总体上,地方政府在财政支出竞争中采用直接竞争模式,而财政效率竞争表现为间接竞争模式,本文对此现象做出了解释。为了提高政府的财政效率,需要确保"用脚投票"机制产生作用,并将财政效率纳入考核标准,促使地方官员不能忽视财政效率的空间对比。While most of existing researches concentrate on competition of fiscal expenditure between local governments,the competition of fiscal efficiency and the difference between them have been always ignored.This paper first calculates 209 cities＇ fiscal efficiency in China based on multi-dimension input-output analysis with data envelopment analysis technique,then conducts a comparison of competition patterns between fiscal expenditure and fiscal efficiency using spatial econometric model.It is found that competition between local governments exists with completely different patterns in two fields,direct contention in fiscal expenditure and indirect in fiscal efficiency.The reasons are debated in the paper.To improve fiscal efficiency of local governments,suggested measures include：ensure the ＂vote with feet＂ mechanism to be effective,and bring fiscal efficiency into assessment standards.

关 键 词：地方政府 财政支出 财政效率 竞争模式 空间计量 

分 类 号：C812[社会学—统计学]