市场化进程、机构投资者与薪酬激励  

MARKETIZATION,INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND COMPENSATION INCENTIVE

作　　者：伊志宏[1] 李艳丽[2] 高伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]北京体育大学管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2011年第10期75-84,共10页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70972130)

摘　　要：本文以沪深两市A股上市公司2003—2010年的数据作为研究样本,探讨了市场化进程、机构投资者与高管薪酬激励三者之间的关系。研究发现,压力抵制型机构投资者与高管薪酬—绩效敏感性显著正相关;市场化进程是影响机构投资者治理作用发挥的重要外部因素,在市场化进程相对较快的地区,压力抵制型机构投资者持股能够对上市公司高管薪酬—绩效敏感性起到促进作用;在市场化进程较慢的地区,压力抵制型机构投资者与高管薪酬—绩效敏感性无显著相关性。研究结果表明,压力抵制型机构投资者有利于公司治理的改善,但是,其积极治理效应的发挥受到市场化进程因素的限制。本文的政策含义在于,解决中国上市公司的治理问题,不仅要继续大力发展机构投资者,还要相应改善其所处的制度环境。This paper tested the relationships among marketization, institutional investors and executive compensation by studying Chinese A-share listed companies of 2003-2010. The research found that a significant positive relationship between pressure-resistant institutional investors＇ shareholdings and executive officers＇ pay-for-performance sensitivity. Further studies reported that marketization was an important factor which would affect institutional investors＇ governance effect. Pressure-resistant institutional investors could improve executive officers＇ pay-for-performance sensitivity only in the area of faster marketization. So it could he said that pressure-resistant institutional investors could play an active role in corporate governance, hut marketization would restrict the governance role of pressure-resistant institutional investors. To solve the problem of corporate governance in China not only need to develop institutional investors, but also to improve institutional environment.

关 键 词：市场化进程 机构投资者 薪酬-绩效敏感性 公司治理 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.92F224