中国版WEEE法规实施中政府和电子企业演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments and Electronic Manufacturers Based on the Implementation of WEEE Regulations

作　　者：付小勇[1] 朱庆华[1] 窦一杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,大连116024

出　　处：《管理评论》2011年第10期171-176,共6页Management Review

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金项目(71025002);国家自然科学基金项目(70772085);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0082);国家自然科学基金国际合作NSFC-JSPS协议项目(70911140101)

摘　　要：文章在政府和电子企业仅具有有限理性的前提下,运用演化博弈方法对中国版WEEE法规将要实施的过程中,政府管制策略选择与电子企业逆向物流策略选择的互动机制进行了分析。结果表明:当电子企业构建逆向物流成本大于电子企业构建逆向物流给电子企业带来的收益与政府的WEEE基金补贴之和时,电子企业策略选择依赖于政府选择策略的概率;当管制成本低于电子企业构建逆向物流带给社会的收益与回收处理费用之和时,政府的策略选择依赖于电子企业选择策略的概率。Given the limited rationality that characterizes both governments and electronic manufacturers,this paper analyzes the interaction mechanism between governments＇ strategy selection and electronic manufacturers＇ strategy selection based on evolutionary game theory in the implementation of China WEEE.The results show that：manufacturers＇ strategy selection depends on the probability of governments＇ strategy selection when the building cost of reverse logistics system（RLS） is more than the sum of the benefits from building of RLS and the subsidies from governments;governments＇ strategy selection depends on the probability of manufacturers＇ strategy selection when the supervising cost of governments is less than the sum of the benefits from building RLS and costs of recycling and disposing used electronic.

关 键 词：演化博弈 管制 构建 逆向物流系统 

分 类 号：F426.6[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32