第三方电子交易市场定价策略探析  

Pricing Strategy of Third-Party Electronic Market

作　　者：邱甲贤[1] 童牧[1] 林漳希[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学四川省金融工程与金融智能重点实验室,成都611130 [2]Center for Advanced Analytics and Business Intelligence,Texas Tech University

出　　处：《吉林大学学报（信息科学版）》2011年第5期484-493,共10页Journal of Jilin University（Information Science Edition）

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基资助金项目(71003081);西南财经大学金融智能与金融工程重点实验室基金资助项目(FIFE2010;A03);西南财经大学实验经济学实验室基金资助项目(10EELC10);西南财经大学科研基金资助项目(2010XG066)

摘　　要：针对第三方电子交易面临的平台定价问题,提出基于我国第三方电子交易市场特征构建双寡头双边市场竞争定价模型,分析了该类市场定价策略及现象。结果表明,平台上用户的最优注册费和交易费,以及双边用户的总费用水平均呈互补关系;不同平台的用户总费用水平正向相关,其中用户最优注册费会随竞争平台对同类用户的总费用增加而下降,最优交易费则会随之增加而上升;当匹配技术提高或用户期望交易次数减少时,平台会倾向于提高用户交易费,降低注册费,反之亦然。在均衡结果的基础上,分析和解释了我国C2C(Customrer-to-Customer)网络购物市场与网络个人借贷市场收费现象及原因。Based on the characteristics of third-party electronic market in China, a two-sided market competition pricing model was builded to analyze and explain the pricing problems faced by the market. The results imply the complementary relationships between the optimal lump-sum in a platform, and also between the total fees paid by users forms, the total user fees are positive correlated each other. real per-transaction fee is increasing as the total fee charged fee and per-transaction fee paid by users of one side of two sides in the same platform. For different plat- The optimal lump-sum fee is declining and the opti- by competitive platform is increasing. Platform will set a higher per-transaction fee and a lower lump-sum fee if the matching technology is advanced or the consumer ＇s expected transaction frequency is declined, and vice versa. Based on the equilibrium analysis, the pricing problems of China＇s C2C （Customer-to-Customer） and online P2P （Peer-to-Peer） market are analyzed and explained.

关 键 词：双边市场 第三方电子交易市场 定价 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术] F49[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]