信息对称悖论与中小企业融资行为  

Information Symmetry Paradox and SME Financing Behavior

作　　者：孙林[1] 杨俊[1] 邵传林[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400043 [2]西北大学经济管理学院,西安710127

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2011年第5期54-64,共11页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70703038);全国教育科学规划课题(EFA080248)

摘　　要：构建一个数理模型论证中小企业互助融资模式的优势,并对互助融资的内在机制进行理论阐释,结果发现银企之间的完全信息会导致双亏,而适度信息不对称能实现双赢;在一定条件下,企业房屋、设备等实物类硬资本与经营能力、财务状况、历史信用等信息类软资本之间具有替代的关系;互助融资模式有助于中小企业拆借到所需的软硬资本,进而有利于其生存和发展;同时中小企业还可通过集体这个"最后借款人"增加自身资信,并使银行调高收益预期,从而最终可实现交换的帕累托最优。The paper developed a mathematical model in order to prove the advantage of the mode of SME＇s mutual financing and to explain the mode＇s internal mechanism.The research showed that there existed information symmetry paradox between bank and SME,when bank required for complete information symmetry,it would lead to loss-loss,and otherwise it would achieve win-win.Under certain conditions,the hard capital,such as housing,equipment,etc.and soft capital,such as operation ability,financial situation,credit history information,etc.can substitute mutually.Moreover,SME can borrow the required hard capital or soft one through mutual aid mode so that it can facilitate its survival and development.Besides,SME can increase credit rating through the＂last borrower＂collective,and reset higher yields for banks,therefore the exchange of Pareto optimality can be realized.

关 键 词：信息不对称 互助融资 中小企业融资 

分 类 号：F830.56[经济管理—金融学]