委托代理与减少污染机制设计  

A Mechanism Design of Reducing Pollution Based on Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：赵健[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《价值工程》2011年第33期299-299,共1页Value Engineering

摘　　要：本文应用委托代理理论研究了减少污染的机制设计问题。为了权衡经济发展和环境保护的关系,从而最大化政府的效用,本文建立了委托代理模型。通过对模型的分析,得到的结论表明,该机制保持经济增长的同时能有效地减少对环境的污染,从而促进经济与环境协调发展。This paper explorers a mechanism design of the coordinated development of economy and environment using principal-agent theory. In order to trade off between economic development and environment protection, a principal-agent model is set up to maximize the governments utility. Through the analysis of the model, the results obtained show that the mechanism can effectively reduce the pollution to the environment as the economy grows, thus, promoting the coordinated development of economy and environment.

关 键 词：委托代理 不对称信息 机制设计 

分 类 号：Q958.116[生物学—动物学]