上市公司应该实施独立监事制度吗?——来自中国证券市场的证据  

Should Listed Companies Introduction the Independent Supervisor System? Evidences from Chinese Securities Markets

作　　者：王世权[1] 宋海英 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,110004 [2]北京清能华通科技发展有限公司,10084

出　　处：《会计研究》2011年第10期69-76,97,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(项目号:10FGL002);The Sumitomo Foundation(项目号:108006);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(项目号:N090406001)

摘　　要：针对中国公司治理制度变迁过程中部分上市公司出现主动设立独立监事的现象,对其动机进行了理论分析,提出了相关假设,并以沪深两市的公司为样本进行了实证检验。研究表明,出于监督动机,控制性股东会基于共享收益选择设立独立监事。出于制衡动机,非控制性股东有动力引入独立监事以平衡过于悬殊的控制权对比,防止控制性股东谋取私利。并且,监事会本身也会基于顾问动机来设立独立监事。但是,与预期相反,作为信号显示动机,那些财务状况相对不佳的上市公司更加倾向于设立独立监事。综合判断,中国上市公司应该实施独立监事制度。最后,进一步明晰了独立监事应具备的要件、中国上市公司实施独立监事制度的时机及其相应制度支持。We analyze the intention to establish independent supervisors in Chinese listed companies theoretically in the process of governance system transference. Besides,related hypotheses are made and tested by the empirical data of companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The results show that controlling shareholders would set up independent supervisor by the monitoring incentive according to benefit sharing. Moreover,the non-controlling shareholders would have motivations of introducing independent supervisors to balance the great disparity of control right and prevent controlling shareholders from obtaining private benefits. Furthermore,the supervisory board would also set up independent supervisors because of the advisory incentive. However,as a signaling incentive,companies with poor financial situation are more inclined to establish independent supervisors,which is contrary to our expectation. We believe that the independent supervisor system should be introduced by listed companies in China by a synthetic judgment. Finally,we discuss the essential conditions of independent supervisor,the timing of introducing the system for Chinese listed companies and the corresponding institutional supports.

关 键 词：监事会 独立监事 监督动机 公司治理 利益相关者 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F276.6F224